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MISAPPROPRIATING CERTAINTY FROM THE
SECURITIES MARKETS: A PRACTITIONER'S
PRIMER ON THE OHAGAN DECISION*
HARVEY L. PiTtt
KARL A. GROSKAUFMANIStt
EDWARD B. WHITTEMOREttt
I. INTRODUCTION

The government won. The lawyer lost. In the process, two
vital prosecutorial weapons against insider trading violations were
sustained.
That was the initial read of the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. O'Hagan.' The O'Hagan Court affirmed both the
validity of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
litigation-constructed "misappropriation theory" of Rule 1Ob-5
liability and the SEC's statutory authority to promulgate Rule 14e-3
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).
The impact of this outcome, however, extends far beyond the
fortunes of one defendant. The manner in which the government
prevailed in O'Hagan will have significant day-to-day implications
for all public companies, asset managers, and the SEC.

* This article previously appeared at Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, The
Supreme Court Has Upheld the MisappropriationTheory, But How Farthe SEC Will Take
the Ruling Is Anything But Clear,Nat'l L.J., Aug. 4, 1997, at B4.
t Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1965,
Brooklyn College; J.D., 1968, St. John's University.
tt Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, Washington, D.C.; B.S., 1984,
Cornell University; LL.B., 1987, University of Toronto; J.D., 1988, University of
Pennsylvania.
ttt Associate, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1990,
Dartmouth College; J.D., 1995, George Washington University.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997). See, e.g., Edward Felsenthal, Big Weapon Against Insider
Tradingis Upheld, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1997, at Cl.
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II. THE O'HAGAN DECISION
James Herman O'Hagan allegedly learned in 1988 that Grand
Metropolitan PLC, a client of his law firm, planned to launch a
tender offer for the Pillsbury Company. Mr. O'Hagan bought
Pillsbury stock and options, generating a tidy $4.3 million profit
when the tender offer was announced. In due course, Mr. O'Hagan
drew the attention of the SEC and the local U.S. Attorney. Mr.
O'Hagan was subsequently convicted of fifty-seven counts of
securities fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. As a result, Mr.
O'Hagan was sentenced to forty-one months in prison.
In a sweeping decision reminiscent of the Supreme Court's
expansive interpretations of the federal securities laws in the 1960s
and early 1970s,2 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg made short shrift of
the objections to the misappropriation theory. Abandoning the
Court's literal reading of the federal securities laws, the majority
ruled that the misappropriation theory was well within the broad
remedial purposes of the Exchange Act. Mr. O'Hagan's attack on
his conviction under Rule 14e-3, which forbids certain trading of
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information relating to a
tender offer, fared no better. The Court held that, in Section 14(e) of
the Exchange Act, Congress expressly delegated to the SEC
sufficient authority to promulgate Rule 14e-3. For good measure, the
Court upheld Mr. O'Hagan's convictions for mail fraud as well.
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Many practitioners and their clients perceived O'Hagan as a
case involving a wayward lawyer. The egregious facts seemed
remote based on their experience. On closer reflection, however, the
sheer breadth of the majority's decision suggests seven implications
that will be important to all public companies and throughout the
financial services industry.
First, O'Hagan will embolden the SEC and the Justice
Department to push the envelope on novel securitiesfraud theories

2. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
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in far less egregious cases. In shaping the misappropriation theory,
the SEC took a calculated gamble that the courts would be more
sympathetic to the theory in extreme cases than they would be to a
significant line of adverse precedent.
The SEC was correct.
Ultimately, six members of the Court bought the SEC's theory.
Until O'Hagan, any expansive reading of the federal securities laws
was constrained by the Court's two-decade-old ruling in Santa Fe
Industries v. Green3 that Rule lOb-5 could not be used to redress
mere breaches of fiduciary duty.' In O'Hagan, the Court limited
Santa Fe to a holding that a breach of fiduciary duty is not actionable
under Rule 1Ob-5 if there is full disclosure of all relevant facts.'
The lasting impact of O'Hagan will be in the difficult "gray"
areas in which, to date, the SEC's Enforcement Division has
tempered its desire to press enforcement actions. One example of
nearly universal relevance relates to perennial concerns regarding the
"selective disclosure" of material information by issuers. Beyond the
parameters of SEC-mandated disclosure, public companies maintain
regular informal contacts with securities analysts, portfolio managers
and the financial press. In a volatile marketplace, the earnings
"expectations" formed through these contacts become a critical
element in the mix of information regarding the company.' When the
company's spokesperson disseminates key information on a selective
basis, one segment of the marketplace is afforded an opportunity to
trade directly on the basis of material, nonpublic information.
The SEC's Enforcement Division often chafes on the
sidelines when such trading occurs. The SEC's predisposition to
prosecute such cases is tempered by its setback in the Supreme
Court's 1983 decision in Dirks v. SEC.7 O'Hagan did not disturb
Dirks' requirement that, in a Rule lOb-5 tipping case, the
government establish a breach of duty on the part of the tipper.'

3. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
4. See id. at 473-76.
5. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209.
6. See, e.g., E.S. Browning, Trading Picks Up During Conference Calls, Evidently
Leaving Small Investors on Hold, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1997, at C2; Suzanne McGee, As
Stock Market Surges Ahead, "Predictable" Profits Are Driving It, WALL ST. J., May 5,
1997, at C1.
7. 463 U.S 646 (1983).

8. See id. at 660-64.
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Nonetheless, the breadth of the Court's O'Hagan ruling will inspire
the SEC's watchdogs to cast a sharper eye at the quarterly dance
between issuers and their analysts.9 The period immediately after
O'Hagan is an opportune time for counsel at public companies to
review internal practices aimed at ensuring broad dissemination of
material information. 0
Second, asset managers shouldreview internalprocedures to
be followed when they receive material,nonpublic information about
a portfolio company. The risks associated with selective disclosure
also run to the other side of the equation. For example, in its 1996
Fox-Pitt,Kelton, Inc. release, the SEC extracted a $50,000 settlement
from a registered broker-dealer whose personnel executed trades on
the basis of material, nonpublic information received over the course
of an analyst's conference call." The SEC's release did not claim
this was illegal insider trading. Instead, the SEC alleged that FoxPitt had not satisfied its obligation, under Section 15(f of the
Exchange Act, to maintain procedures reasonably designed to
prevent the illegal use of material, nonpublic information. The SEC
was not deterred by the considerable legal uncertainty of whether,
under Dirks, trading on such information is illegal or, for that matter,
whether information disseminated broadly to analysts could in any
way be considered "nonpublic."
These legal uncertainties provide scant comfort to mutual
fund managers, pension fund administrators, and other institutional
investors who have little desire to sacrifice their resources and good
names to help the SEC frame legal standards through the
enforcement process. The best prophylactic measure against such an
outcome is an internal regimen that requires personnel involved in
asset management to flag situations in which the firm may have
received material information on a selective basis. Both the
institution and the, individual will be less susceptible to the
9. Presented with the right facts, the SEC has displayed a willingness to authorize
such enforcement actions. See SEC v. Stevens, Lit. Rel. No. 12813, 48 SEC Dkt (CCH)
739 (Mar. 19,1991).
10. See generally Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, For the Issuer, It's
Sometimes Tempting to ProvideAnalysts with Non-PublicInformation, NAT'L L.J., Apr, 18,
1994.
1.1. See In re Fox-Pitt, Kelton, Inc., Exchange Act Rel. No. 37940, 63 SEC Dkt. (CCH)
452 (Nov. 12, 1996).
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enforcement process when the receipt of the information resulted in a
careful review of the circumstances. 2
Third, Rule 14e-3 's validity heightens the need to preserve
the confidentiality of deal-relatedinformation. Any time a company
is involved in a tender offer, there are compelling business reasons to
keep that information secret. A flurry of trading activity in response
to inadvertent leaks can scuttle the transaction. O'Haganreinforces
the government's strong incentive to prosecute this trading by relying
on Rule 14e-3. 3 O'Hagan has spared the government the need, in
marginal cases, to conduct the mental contortions necessary to
"uncover" a duty that has been breached.
In concept, everyone involved in a transaction understands
the need to safeguard the sanctity of this potent information. In
practice, it often falls on counsel to structure meaningful ground
rules to ensure that only a limited number of people with a "need to
know" have access to sensitive information. In addition, it is
important for counsel to ensure that code words are used in sensitive
documents. The temptations associated with this information are
legion. In the heat of getting the deal done, it is important to
remember that, on many occasions, the SEC or the exchanges will
review not only the trading preceding the announcement, but also the
practices followed in safeguarding the information.
Fourth,Rule 14e-3 's validity should cause asset managers to
revisit the way in which marketplace rumors regardingtender offers
are handled within the organization. Despite everyone's best efforts,
putative tender offers often become the source of marketplace
rumors. There is no proscription against trading on the basis of such
rumors. O'Hagan, however, adds to the risks. An institutional
investor easily can find itself as the largest single buyer in the
waning days before the public announcement of the tender offer.
Now is the time to counsel traders and portfolio managers on the
distinctions between true market rumors and inadvertent leaks from

12. For a more detailed discussion see Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufinanis,
Analysts on the Receiving End of an Issuer's Selective Disclosure Need to be Just as
Circumspect as Those Who Do the Disclosing,NAT'L L.J., Apr. 25, 1994.
13. Rule 14e-3(a) proscribes trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information
when that information is obtained from the person making a tender offer, the target of the

tender offer or anyone acting on behalf of either.
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deal participants that might be prosecuted under Rule 14e-3. It also
is a good time to reinforce the wisdom of preserving research files so
that after the fact a trader can demonstrate that a securities purchase
4
was driven by far more than a single rumor.
Fifth, by stressingthe use of nonpublic information, O'Hagan
supports the validity of "Chinese wall" procedures. Chinese wall
procedures are aimed at containing the flow of material, nonpublic
information within an organization and are a staple in the securities
markets. It is these procedures that allow a multiservice securities
firm to continue to trade a security for retail customers while that
firm's investment banking arm is completing a material, undisclosed
transaction involving the same company. The premise underlying an
effective Chinese wall is that the use of material, nonpublic
information, rather than mere possession, should be the operative
standard for insider trading liability.
The SEC consistently has argued that mere "possession" of
material, nonpublic information suffices. Thus, if the SEC can show
that someone possessed material, nonpublic information, that is
enough to warrant a finding of liability. O'Hagan undermines the
SEC's "possession" theory of insider trading liability. On several
occasions, the O'Hagan decision stressed that the test for insider
trading liability is whether the accused person traded on the basis of
material, nonpublic information.'5
Sixth, public companies should double their monitoring of
personal trading by key corporate insiders. Corporate officers and
directors confront a myriad of traps when they trade their company's
securities. At many companies, corporate counsel guide insiders
through this regulatory maze. However, this guidance is not solely
an act of beneficence. Studies of securities class actions filed since
14. The availability of such research can be instrumental in deflecting insider trading
violations. See Harvey L. Pitt, Karl A. Groskaufmanis & Thomas A. Ferrigno, Lessons
From the Government's Losses: Beyond Moran, Hoover, Adler and Bryan, INSIGHTS, May
1996, at 16.

15. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997) (noting that,
under the misappropriation theory, "the fiduciary's fraud is consummated ... when,
without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities");
see also id. at 2207 ("Under [the misappropriation] theory, a fiduciary's undisclosed, selfserving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of
loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information."
(emphasis added)).
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the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
reveal an increased proclivity to tie contemporary securities class
actions, in part, to allegations of well-timed trades by corporate
insiders. 6 Since these cases often end in seven-figure settlements, a
company has more than a passing interest in the trading of its senior
officers.
The interests of the company and its key personnel can be
best protected when their trades are subject to an internal
preclearance requirement. Such a regimen can prevent problematic
trades and can diminish the government's capacity to claim, after the
fact, that insiders intended to violate the federal securities laws.
O'Hagan reinforced this analysis by observing that a defendant
deceives nobody and is not subject to liability if the insider trading
7
has been disclosed to a principal and consent was obtained.
Regarding disclosure and consent, the Court was addressing an
abstraction because issuers are unlikely to authorize otherwise illegal
trading. However, counsel is still diminishing a significant risk by
providing an advance review of trades.
Finally, the O'Hagan decision may lead to greater SEC
emphasis on controllingpersonalliabilityfor corporations. Section
21A of the Exchange Act vests the SEC with broad authority to seek
a penalty against virtually any employer for its lapses in controlling
illegal insider trading. While O'Hagan suggested that Rule 1Ob-5
liability could be avoided through consent of the company, the Court
also ominously suggested that corporations might be liable with
respect to Rule 14e-3 charges if they are aware of, or acquiesce in, a
misuse of their own confidential information. 8 The SEC can be
expected to place greater emphasis on the steps companies take to
monitor improper trading by employees and the steps they take to
redress such misconduct when trading of that nature occurs.

16. See Office of the General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, Report to
the President and the Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 22 (Apr. 1997) (noting that 48% of class action complaints
are premised, in part, on allegations of illegal insider trading).
17. See O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2208, 2211 n.9.

18. See id. at2211 n.9.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Few of these issues were aired in the briefing and oral
argument in the O'Hagan case because the government deftly picked
the right case to test the misappropriation theory. The majority
opinion wasted little time in noting that the illegal trading was
intended to generate profits to conceal previous embezzlement from
client trust funds and that Mr. O'Hagan had been disbarred,
convicted and sentenced by a state court for these defalcations.19
James O'Hagan evoked little sympathy.
The outcome of Mr. O'Hagan's appeal is that the government
and the courts will remain free to make up insider trading law as they
go along. As the enforcement process is used to craft rules for public
companies and market participants, good people trying to do the right
thing nonetheless will get enmeshed in the litany of subpoenas and
testimony under oath. That is not necessarily the best way to set the
rules for our securities markets. But it remains the status quo after
the O'Hagandecision.

19. See id. at 2205 & n.2 (citing In re O'Hagan, 450 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. 1990); State
v. O'Hagan, 474 N.W.2d 613 (Minn. App. 1991)).

